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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
LEGAL THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
By H. ROTTSCHAEFER*
PE same body of data may be considered from more than a
single point of view. A given geological formation means one
thing to an oil prospector, and a quite different thing to a paleontol-
ogist. Their arrangements of the facts in the order of their relative
importance would show considerable differences; the selections of
each would be determined by his special interests or purposes.
The data of our legal system and the facts of the social life it is
intended to control in part can likewise be viewed from various
angles. The questions that can legitimately be asked concerning
them are as numerous and varied as the interests of those who
make them the subject of inquiry. The first interest of those
actively engaged as lawyers or judges in the practical administra-
tion of law is perforce the problem of the law applicable to par-
ticular situations. An agent innocently exceeds his powers and
purports to make a contract between his principal and a third
party who claims compensation from the agent for the loss clue
to his failure to procure a contract binding the principal. The
problem of the lawyer and judge is to determine the legal rule,
if any, governing the relationships involved in the group of facts
that constitutes this case. Its decision will eventuate in the formu-
lation of a rather narrow and specific rule describing the constitu-
tive facts and their legal consequences. It is, therefore, not un-
natural that the attention of those concerned with the practical
administration of law has been focussed on the question of what is
the law. This special emphasis is not necessarily incompatible
with a broader interest in the legal system, but it may easily induce
the view that the general problems of law have but a minor signifi-
cance, particularly for those whose primary interest is in its prac-
tice. The succeeding discussion is intended to examine the validity
of that position, and to consider the practical importance of scien-
tific and philosophic examinations of our legal system that are still
frequently deemed mere speculative inquiries of doubtful value.
This is in substance the problem of the value of jurisprudence
considered as the study of the general problems of law.
*Professor of Law, University of Minnesota.
'LEGAL THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
There is no generally accepted definition of the term jurispru-
dence, and no general agreement as to what subjects are within
its scope. The adoption of the definition of the analytical school
that it is the formal science of positive lawL would definitely ex-
ctude the whole contribution of the philosophical and sociological
jurists. If the adoption of a new terminology were as easy as its
invention, it would be desirable to apply distinct terms to these
extremely diverse approaches to legal systems as is done by some
of the writers of Continental Europe.2 This would not, however,
eliminate disputes as to what general aspects of law deserved con-
sideration, and is not likely to be soon achieved. The term will
probably continue to be used to describe lines of inquiry differing
greatly in their aims and techniques. It is necessary, therefore,
to state briefly the broad outlines of the competing conceptions of
jurisprudence. Practically all attempted definitions can be classi-
fied into those that emphasize its character as a science,3 those
that stress its character as philosophy,4 and those that recognize
both these elements without particularly stressing either.5 It is
immaterial for present purposes to consider the relative merits of
these views; it is sufficient to state that, if the name is to continue
to be applied to The diverse discussions which it is presently made
to cover, it will have to be defined to include both the science and
philosophy of law. There is no particular objection to including
within a single field of study such diverse types of thought if only
it be clearly recognized that jurisprudence as a science and phi-
losophy have entirely distinct aims and, consequently, methods.
The inclusion of both means only that the data of legal systems
raise certain problems susceptible of treatment by the methods of
science, and others that can be dealt with only by philosophic in-
quiry.
The aim of science has been described as the classification of
facts and the recognition of the relationships existing between
them.6 The facts which a science of law would aim to classify com-
prise a limited part of the conduct of men living in society. A
makes a false statement about B to C who, influenced thereby,
"Holland, The Elements of Jurisprudence, llth ed., chapter 1.
2Berolizheimer, The World's Legal Philosophies (The Modern Legal
Philosophy Series, II) Introduction; Gareis, Science of Law, sec. 3.3Holland, op. cit.4Lorimer, Institutes of Law 2nd ed., 353. 355.5Salmond, Jurisprudence 7th ed., pages 1-16.6Karl Pearson, The Grammar of Science, 3rd ed. p. 6.
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refuses to employ B whom he had been intending to take into his
service. This aggregate of facts is not one requiring to be classi-
fied by any science of law, however much it may raise the problem
of whether it ought to be covered by a legal rule. If, however,
there be added the fact that organized society (which under modern
conditions of politically organized society usually means the state,
whatever it may have meant in other historical periods), acting
through one of its recognized agencies, will compel A to com-
pensate B for the injury in fact inflicted upon him, or impose on
A other defined consequences, the fact group assumes a different
complexion and becomes a datum of a legal system.T A legal
datum may be defined as any group of facts that includes the
reaction of organized society, acting through its recognized
agencies, to the situation composed by the other facts of the group.
It is not essential that such fact group shall ever have existed. A
statute may define as a crime a certain combination of facts which,
coupled with the fact of the defined social reaction thereto, con-
stitutes a legal datum even before any such group has in fact
occurred. It is these legal data that it is the function of the
science of law to classify.
Each such datum can be expressed in some form of proposi-
tion of which the legal rule furnishes an example. Legal rules
are mere devices of our thinking for describing the groups of facts
and relationships denoted by the term legal data. The rule that
two witnesses to a will are required to give it validity is a form
of mental short-hand to describe the fact that society has under-
taken to establish a certain relationship between defined facts.
The body of these rules themselves constitute an independent ob-
ject of our knowledge distinct from the fact groups they sum-
marize, and as such comprises the working tool of the lawyer
and judge. There is none who would question the desirability of
systematizing the body of those rules as an aid to fashioning a
more efficient fool for practice. The systematization of those
rules affords the easiest approach to the classification of the legal
data described by those rules in so far as the purpose is merely the
construction of a technique that will make those data easier to
handle. This has been the primary aim of analytical jurisprudence
which has been rather aptly described as the application of logic
to law.8 Its principal instruments have been the concept and
7See J. W. Bingham. What is Law, 11 Mich. L. Rev. 1, 109.8See anonymous article, commonly attributed to J. S. Mill, entitled,
Austin on Jurisprudence in 118 Edinburgh Review 439.
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definition which may be defined as general ideas denoting the
presence of common elements among the legal data included
therein. The state, for example, has undertaken to protect the
physical integrity of A's person against B's aggression; it has also
assumed to recognize A's claim to be served by a public utility
when A demands the service if he offers to comply with the
utility's reasonable regulations. These diverse situations possess
the common element that the state recognizes A's affirmative claim
to a certain course of conduct by B and the utility which is de-
scribed by saying that A has in each case a right against the other
party. The general idea "right" is a device of our thinking that
permits a number of concrete legal data to be grouped together,
and denotes a point of view from which those data can be con-
ceived of as members of a single class. The same is true of the
terms used to describe other types of legal relation such as duty,
power, and liability, and combinations of such relations as prop-
erty. Any legal system is likely to include a considerable number
of such analytical or formal general ideas that frequently imply
classifications of legal data on different bases. The general term
"property" denotes not a single legal relation but an aggregate
of several of them, such as rights, powers, and privilegesY A
classification of legal data on the basis of the kind of legal relation
involved would result in distributing the data described by the
term "property" among several classes; a classification on the
basis of the type of interest protected might bring them all within
a single group. The distribution of the materials varies with the
basis of classification adopted, and that depends wholly on the
purpose for which it is made. The formal general ideas hereto-
fore mentioned have been devised to impose on legal data a
measure of system and logical integration as an aid to our thinking
about the legal system and to its use as a tool for practice. They
describe the forms under which facts must be presented if they
are to be considered as factors in a legal problem, but can not
furnish the content of the rule that will define the social reaction
to those facts. The concepts legal right and duty are invaluable
in formulating as a legal problem the relations between A and B
when the former suffers nervous prostration caused by fright,
unaccompanied by physical impact, due to the latter's carelessness;
but the decision for or against A's claim to protection from in-
juries thus caused requires a resort to factors not implicit in the
OHohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions 96, ff.
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definition of these formal logical concepts.10 The general con-
ceptions of the legal science of the analytical jurists are a frame-
work that gives form and system to our thinking about legal
data, and are valuable only within those limits. They furnish no
aid in dealing with other important general problems of law."
There are, however, numerous points of view from which the
facts of a legal system may be considered and classified. All
involve the same resort to gerieralization that characterizes the
approach of the analytical jurists, and as a consequence a degree
of systematization of legal data. A useful approach to legal data
is that which considers their content as distinct from their formal
aspects. It is of some value to analyze the concept "property"
into its component formal elements;12 it is of greater value to
discover broad principles expressing the content or substance of a
variety of* specific legal data involving the aggregate of legal rela-
tions described by that concept. The principle that no one can
transfer a better title than he himself has may be taken as an
illustration. It sums up a great number of specific legal rules
dealing with the transfer and acquisition of property, although
it does not cover them all since there are circumstances under
which our law confers a power to transfer a better title than the
transferror had. The power of a thief to transfer a good title by
sale in market overt is a familiar historical instance. Every de-
veloped legal system contains a great number of such generaliza-
tions that summarize the content of numerous specific legal rules,
but whose scope is frequently less extensive than the totality of
rules concerned with the relationships dealt with in the general-
ization. There are exceptions to practically every general legal
principle that has ever been formulated. The exceptions to one
principle are frequently the specific data of another generalization.
The rule that an owner can be divested of his property by a sale
by the person to whom he has entrusted its possession under cir-
cumstances clothing the latter with apparent ownership is clearly
in conflict with the logical implications of the principle denying
one's power to transfer a better title than he had; it is, however,
within the principle that he whose acts produce an appearance that
certain facts exist will not be permitted to deny that such facts
1°For a discussion of the factors that have influenced courts in de-
ciding cases of that character, see Green v. Shoemaker, (1909) 111 Md.
69, 73 Atl. 688 and cases therein cited.
"IM. R. Cohen, The Place of Logic in the Law, 29 Harv. T.. R cv. 622.
12Hohfeld, op. cit.; Holland, op. cit, at pp. 187 ff.
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existed if to do so would injure those who have acted in reliance
upon such appearances.
Generalizations of the character under consideration perform
a different function within the legal system than the system of
formal concepts of the analytical jurists. They are something
more than a convenient device for retaining and dealing with the
mass of detailed legal rules and data. They are in practise the
major premises of a great deal of the judicial reasoning employed
in the development of the law. Their function as such is not, and
cannot be, due to their character as summaries of past legal expe-
riences and data already contained within the legal system; it is
due rather to the desire to give to the content of the legal system
a degree of logical consistency as an aid to certainty and predicta-
bility. Their use in .the processes of legal deduction is based on
the assumption that it is desirable that law have those character-
istics; its validity is not a problem for legal science. The process
of logical deduction from accepted premises accounts for a part
only of the content of legal systems. The facts of individual and
social life are the really vital determinants of that content, and our
present knowledge negatives any theory that they follow lines
defined by the requirements of logical thinking. The clearest
proof of this is the frequent occurrence of cases to which several
general principles are applicable that would, however, result in
contradictory decisions. The situation described near the close of
the preceding paragraph illustrates this difficulty. The decision in
such case cannot be reached by any amount of the most accurate
logical deduction. There must be a preliminary selection of one of
those principles as a premise if the case is to subsumed under an
existing principle. That selective process is not a matter of formal
logic at all. The factors that determine that choice are much
more significant in shaping law's contents than is the logical de-
ductive process employed in deciding particular cases on the basis
of those principles. The real reasons that induced the court in
Rylands v. Fletcher'3 to adopt as its premise the principle of acting
at one's peril rather than that of liability based on fault, are more
. important for an understanding of law and its development than
the fact that courts give their reasoning the forms of logical
thinking.14  It is true that the content of legal systems achieves
1-3(1868) L. R. 3 H. L. 330.
140. W. Holme3, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L Rev. 457.
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a measure of systematization through these generalizations, but
it will probably never acquire the degree of logical integration
attainable in classifying legal data from the point of view of their
formal characteristics. The chief importance of this type of gen-
eralization is, however, their function as premises for legal reason-
ing in the development of law.
Generalizations of this character can be arranged in an hier-
archy on the basis of how extensively they pervade the system.
The principle as to the transfer of title heretofore mentioned is
less pervasive than the conception of public policy which invali-
dates contracts, interposes barriers to the alienation of property,
and generally leaves wrongdoers where it finds them. The stand-
ards of good faith and reasonable care, which are merely short-
hand devices for indicating certain broad generalizations, are ap-
plied in a great many distinct fields. The most inclusive are what
may be called its broad premises or general assumptions. These
are frequently the most difficult to discover since they are quite
as likely to be tacitly assumed as explicitly formulated. A refer-
ence to several found in our own system will make clear what is
meant. The body of common and statute law dealing with monop-
olies and contracts in restraint of trade involves an assumption
that it is on the whole desirable to maintain a competitive economic
order. Many of the decisions on the limits imposed on the sub-
stance of legislation by the due process clauses of our constitutions
are expressions of a strong belief in the theory of individualism.
Mr. Justice Holmes may be correct in his statement that the four-
teenth amendment did not enact Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"
but the prevalence of the ideas expressed therein at least helps in
understanding the decisions interpreting that amendment during
the last quarter of the last century. The commerce clause of the
federal constitution definitely embodies a policy of free trade
among the states. These premises and assumptions are as much
a part of the legal system as the narrower principles that merely
summarize a series of specific legal rules, since they furnish the
starting point for a considerable body of legal and judicial reason-
ing. It is immaterial that they may be derived from the social
and philosophic preferences of those in a position to influence
and shape the development of law, and that their discovery may
require a resort to past or current social theories and philosophies.
35Dissent in Lochner v. New York, (1905) 198 U. S. 45, 49 1. Ed.
937, 25 Sup. Ct. 539.
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Some of them are discoverable by an inductive study of the ma-
terials of the legal system itself. As in the case of the narrower
principles, their logical implications are frequently inconsistent,
and for the same reasons. The principle of freedom of contract
carries a germ capable of destroying the competitive economic
order. The terms in which these premises and assumptions are
formulated are broad and vague. Such conceptions as due process
and police power defy precise definition or even accurate descrip-
tion. This factor not infrequently results in obscuring the fact
that a particular decision has involved a choice between competing
premises. A court is required to determine the validity of a state
statute prescribing minimum wages for women in industry. The
court might approach the question from a conception of the
police power as the power to promote the general welfare or as
the power to promote that welfare only by methods not involving
arbitrary limitations on individual freedom. The adoption of the
latter would not as clearly disclose the fact of a choice between
the premise of the primacy of the social interest and that of indi-
vidualism. That choice, which is inevitable in such case, has been
made in defining the premise. The narrower principles remain
fairly fixed in their actual content, but those more inclusive gen-
eralizations herein described as the premises and assumptions of
a legal system are constantly changing in fact through the process
of redefinition even though they may retain their older forms.
The due process clause was not in fact the same in Lochner v. New
York"- as in Muller v. Oregon.7 New wine is constantly being
poured into old bottles.
The preceding discussion has shown how extensively the selec-
tion of premises and choosing between them in cases of conflict
affect the development of law, and function in shaping its content.
The creative power of these general ideas is not due to the fact
that they are taken as major premises for legal reasoning. That
is a merely formal incident to our efforts to cast our legal thinking
in the forms of logical deduction. The reason that invalidates
contracts in unreasonable restraint of trade is that our society has
adjudged competition in the economic sphere desirable and has
undertaken to make that judgment effective through state force,
not the fact that the proposition can be logically deduced from a
premise embodying that judgment. The factor that gives these
16(1905) 198 U. S. 45, 25 Sup. Ct. 539, 49 L Ed. 937.
17(1908) 208 U. S. 412, 52 L. Ed. 551, 28 Sup. Ct 324.
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generalizations their creative force is the character of the data
summarized by them. They are in form summarizations of the
past reactions of the organized social group to definite situations.
The principle that no one can transfer a better title than he him-
self had sums up a great many specific cases in which society has
refused to recognize as the owner of a thing one who acquired
it from a non-owner. The social reactions thus summarized may
or may not have been based on reasons clearly perceived and defi-
nitely formulated; they may have had no other basis than vague
feeling or instinct. Whatever their basis, they embody a judgment
as to the value of some human end or activity or the relative
values of different human ends and activities. The principle just
given by way of illustration clearly implies a judgment that, in the
situations covered by it, society considers the protection of exist-
ing property rights more important than facilitating transfers by
insuring the security of acquisitions. These generalizations are,
therefore, essentially expressions of society's judgments as to the
value or relative values of the concrete materials and interests of
individual and social life. They are such because each specific
decision or legal rule summarized by them had implicit within it
a judgment of that character. This does not necessarily mean
that every such decision and principle involved a conscious ap-
praisal of those ends and interests at the time they were made or
formulated. It is, however, desirable -to consciously recognize
this characteristic of these general ideas and principles in our
legal system if we desire its development to approximate a rational
process. It is at least tacitly done whenever the reason of the
rule is invoked in attempting to define its limits. Its explicit
recognition is essential to prevent legal principles and premises
from acquiring the character of unconditioned absolutes that th!
desire for definiteness is likely to impose upon them. The com-
mon distinction between malum prohibitum and malum in se
furnishes an instance of that tendency. It is perfectly intelligible
if considered as a device for stating that society considers certain
values more important than others; it is of doubtful value if
taken as a permanent and necessary classification of acts based on
their inherent nature. Its uncritical acceptance inevitably stifles
efforts at understanding the real basis for differences in legal rules
invoking it. That A's accidental killing of B is manslaughter if
A was at the time wantonly shooting at his neighbor's chickens.
but no crime of any kind if A was shooting game in violation of a
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statute, is scarcely explained by basing the difference in the legal
nature of the killing on the fact that shooting at the chickens is
malum in se while shooting game in violation of statute is malum
prohibitum.'8  The difference in the legal nature of A's act under
those differing circumstances may be justified, but it adds little
to an understanding of legal processes to derive it as an inference
from the distinction between malum prohibitum and malum in
se. The result is not so irrational if we consider the actualities
intended to be described by these rather formalistic phrases.. The
law evidently regards private property in the chickens of more
importance than the state's interest in wild game, and therefore
subjects to greater risks infringements of the former than'of the
latter. The distinction between" malum prohibitum and malum in
se, and its use in legal reasoning, thus becomes intelligible, but at
once loses its absolutism because its character as a shorthand
method of stating a series of group judgments of relative social
value is thereby disclosed and it becomes easier to grasp the.idea
that they are judgments that time and place may modify. A
similar analysis would reveal the value judgments implicit in other
general legal principles; they are frequently explicit in what
have been herein called the broad premises and assumptions of
legal systems. Their consideration from this angle discloses legal
development, whether by legislation or judicial decision, as a con-
tinuing process of the selection of values and a scale of relative
values that society is attempting to make effective through law.
The realization that this is what is happening is of more than
theoretical importance; it is a practical aid for the intelligent
practice of law."
The fact that these general ideas embody group judgments as
to the relative worth of different human ends and activities does
not wholly explain even the method of legal development. The
history of law records the rise, decline And even disappearance of
many of such judgments. The law of feudal England clearly
aimed to maintain a different kind of society than that of nine-
teenth century England. The law of the earlier period accepted
governmental price fixing as a quite normal thing; that of the
later period considered it a policy to be invoked only in exceptional
cases. A legal system at any given time contains a great many of
such judgments based on past experience and presently competing
IsSee discussion in .Bishop. Criminal Law 9th ed., secs. 331-333.19Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process.
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forces. The decision of each new case on the basis of principles
theretofore developed involves a determination that the old scale
of values is to be retained. If a legal system imposes liability
only for fault, every denial of relief where the injury is not due
to some one's fault constitutes a reaffirmation of the validity of
past value judgments. Those past judgments, therefore, can func-
tion as creative forces in shaping law only as long as, and to the
extent that, a decision is made that society shall continue to aim
at realizing the order of values derived from the past. The first
decision in the legal system, assumed in the illustration just given,
imposing liability independently of fault represents a first step in
establishing a new value judgment as an efficient force in legal
development. The process by which old principles are redefined
in adjusting conflicts between them is essentially a revision of
past value judgments of a somewhat less dramatic kind. It
represents, however, the most common form in which such revi-
sion occurs in developed systems with a long history. The sud-
den introduction of a new value to be realized through law may
at times involve all the inconveniences incident to rapid readjust-
ments.
This process of revision is likely to be a rather continuous one
except in periods of extreme stagnation. It is accomplished in our
system by both legislation and judicial decision. The theory that
the common law is adequate to meet the changing conditions of a
world that refuses to stand still is a sufficient recognition of the
function of courts in this process. 20 The truism that legislatures
have greater freedom in this respect than courts requires no dis-
cussion. The former are subject to legal limitations only where
constitutional provisions restrain them. Such restrictions on leg-
islative action as our due process clauses and the other provisions
of our bills of rights are themselves definite commitments to the
theory that our society deems certain values of such importance
as to-be beyond the reach of ordinary legislation" and requiring an
extraordinary process for their modification or elimination. It is
immaterial in this connection that some of them are expressed in
terms so broad and vague as to render considerable revision pos-
sible without recognizing any formal change. More than a half
century of litigation has failed to define the precise values pro-
tected by the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, and
20W. B. Hornblower, A Century of "Judge-Made" Law, 7 Col. L.
Rev. 453.
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the decisions disclose considerable differences as to the degree of
individual freedom it protects. The rent legislation sustained in
Block v. Hirsh2 ' and Marcus Bro-an Holding Co. v. Feldman '-
would almost certainly have been held invalid by the court that
decided Munm v. Illinois."- Even these constitutional limitations,
however, do not deny the group's right to revise the scale of values
handed down-to it from the past; they merely restrict the legal
methods of their revision. The argument sometimes advanced
that there are implied limits on the power to amend the federal
constitution is clearly untenable.2' There is, perhaps, no politi-
cally organized society whose legal system does not assume a right
of such revision vested in some one or more of its organs. The
only method which it would be at all logical for the law to deny
is that by revolution. Though, as already stated, courts exercise
this function in our system, they have evolved one conspicuous
principle aimed at retarding the rate of such revision, namely,
the familiar principle of interpretation that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be strictly construed. It would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to find a logical justification for it; its real
basis is the historical importance of judge-made law in our legal
system rationalized into that philosophic theory as to the nature of
the common law long entertained by our legal profession."-' The
rationalization was intended to justify an innate conservatism, and
the principle itself reflects and embodies a theory as to the relative
values of stability and change in the achievement of a social order
through law. This is its most significant aspect. Like every other
general legal principle its essence is the value judgment implicit
in it. This negative factor must not, however, blind us to the
important and useful part played by our courts in those revisions
of the values our society has sought to realize through law that
have given that law its vitality in a changing society. The tech-
nique by which courts have performed this function is beyond the
purview of the present discussion since it would require detailed
consideration of such problems as the function of logic, analogy,
fiction and interpretation in the development of law.
21(1921) 256 U. S. 135, 65 L Ed. 865, 41 Sup. Ct. 458.
22(1921) 256 U. S. 170, 65 L. Ed. 877, 41 Sup. Ct. 465.
2(1876) 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. Ed. 77.
24-See argument in The Prohibition Cases, (1920) 253 U. S. 350, 64 L
Ed. 946, 40 Sup. Ct. 486; see also Leser v. Garnett, (1922) 258 U. S. 130,
66 L. Ed. 505, 42 Sup. Ct. 217.
25See generally Carter. Law: Its Origin, Growth and Function.
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The preceding discussion has shown a legal system as a com-
plex series of evaluative judgments that are frequently incon-
sistent. The complexity and inconsistency merely reflect the fre-
quent absence of agreement among the members of the social
group as to what interests and ends are worthwhile, which shall
be sought if some only are obtainable, and how far one shall be
pursued at the expense of others. A society of artists would
scarcely hold that aesthetic ends alone did not justify exercises
of the police power; one composed of average persons as we
know them might well refuse to surrender any end more directly
connected with its material needs to attain the former. The ends
a legal order aims to achieve at any given period are the product
of past experience and presently competing forces. The empha-
sis on individual freedom in our own present system can be ex-
plained through history, but that cannot explain how its selection
for realization by law came about irl the first instance. It would
be a difficult, but not impossible, task to discover the ends and
order of values aimed at by a legal system at any given time. It
would, however, merely furnish a catalogue of our premises that
should be extremely useful but would leave untouched the problem
of how that system came to select them, which should be care-
fully distinguished from that of how they should be selected.
The factors determining the actual selection raise several distinct
but related problems. The order of values a state seeks to impose
by law derives its elements from the wants and aspirations of
individuals composing the social group. These do not all have the
same scale of values. There are certain to be a limited number
of human objectives common to practically all the members of
the group; and it is quite likely that a considerable proportion of
the group will rate the relative order of those objectives in the
same way. Most men would sell a treasured art object to keep
from starving; the case of the Viennese artist who preferred to
starve to selling his- piano is bound to be an exception. These
individual value rankings, however, usually define only an order
of ends that each individual conceives as his own. They state the
order in which he will satisfy his wants, not how he ranks his
desire for luxuries in comparison with another's desire for neces-
sities. The principal problem of any social group with limited
resources is the evaluation of the claims of its different members,
and the order of values it undertakes to establish through law is
comprised in large part of a series of judgments on the relative
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importance of such competing claims. There are some who would
include therein even the cases in which the group conceives itself
as a unit making claims on its own behalf. It follows that the
presence of certain premises in a legal system cannot be fully ex-
plained in terms of the existence of a fairly general, or even uni-
versal, agreement on an individual scale of values among the mem:
bers of a social group. There are perhaps none who would rate
gum-chewing as high as-adequate housing, and yet a legal system
that attaches a high value to individual liberty may in practise
permit the desire of some to chew gum to be satisfied in preference
to the want of others for a proper shelter. The result does not
prove that the whole group, or even a considerable part of it,
consciously rates individual liberty so highly as to be willing to
accept even that consequence, but is capable of a variety of inter-
pretations. It may mean merely that that particular part of the
group that is able to get its views adopted into the law considers
individual freedom not too dear even at that price, and that the
others prefer from reasons of ignorance or inertia to acquiesce.
The value judgments that become legal premises are usually those
of less than all the members of the group, and may be those of a
comparatively limited portion thereof. They define the relative
order of the competing claims, similar or dissimilar, of the mem-
bers of the group. They need not give equal weight to the same
claim of different individuals; the safety of a high official may be
rated more highly than that of an ordinary citizen. They may
even rate one claim of an individual or group higher than another
claim of another individual or group though all concerned would
place the latter above the former in their own individual value
scales; A's freedom of contract may in effect be given or permit-
ted to have precedence over B's claim to a standard of living which
A himself might deem more important for himself than complete
freedom of contract. They cannot, however, go too far in this
direction without irousing an opposition that may in time destroy
them. The factors that determine whose value judgments become
legal premises are primarily matters of political theory, although
they impinge on legal theory in so far as courts function in their
selection. The whole question of how far courts shall be guided
in testing legislation for conformity with due process by general
opinion that a particular exercise of the police power is a reason-
able means for accomplishing a given end illustrates this.28  It
28See J. L. Nesbltt, Due Process of Law and Opinion, 26 Col. Rev. 23.
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is, in any event, the task of legal theory to describe what happens
when a legal premise is adopted. It is essential not only to know
that such premises represent value judgments that the group is
undertaking to make effective through law, but also to grasp the
play of forces that operate in their selection. It shows in part
how a system gets its premises and their relation to the facts of
individual and social life; the insoluble why thereof it leaves un-
answered.
A legal system, however, is something more than a system of
such premises. That represents but one of the many points of
view from which it can be considered. It is equally a system of
social machinery for effectuating the ends postulated by the society
living under it. The evaluation of that machinery to determine
its fitness for realizing those assumed ends constitutes an impor-
tant practical problem. This requires no further emphasis in
these days of constant complaints that the machinery of our
criminal law has suffered an alarming breakdown. It is in dealing
with problems of that character that the methods of science can
and should be employed, in the sense that the judgment whether
or not the means adopted tend to produce the intended results
should be based of an inductive study of the facts. It will proba-
bly be practically impossible to employ the methods of deliberate
experimentation to any great extent in this connection. It is
theoretically possible to determine the relative tendencies of capital
and other forms of punishment to prevent murder, although the
quality of many of the studies of the correlations between social
data should guard one against the uncritical acceptance of their
conclusions. A society that assumed that the sole end of punish-
ment was prevention might well govern its choice of punishment
for murder by the results of such investigations. They would not
help that society to decide whether to adopt prevention of murder
or the reform of the murderer as the end of punishment unless
they disclosed that no .punishment prevented murder, 'which might
induce it to abandon the former for the latter theory. Certain
legal principles are important as means for realizing ends ex-
pressed in some more inclusive premise. Freedom of contract is
significant because of its relation to individual freedom. It is a
question of fact whether a given form of the former insures the
development of the latter, and should be determined by an in-
ductive study of the facts rather rather than a priori reasoning.
The method is not limited to testing the adequacy of the means
LEGAL THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
adopted to secure an assumed end. The conformance of legisla-
tion to the requirements of due process may depend on whether
it is a reasonable means for promoting a recognized police power
end. Whatever may be the character of a judgment that it is a
reasonable means, the judgment that it is a means, which under-
lies the former, is one of fact that should be arrived at by the
best technique available for discovering relations between factual
data. Wherever the legal quality of an act is made to depend on
its relation to some end assumed by the legal system, the methods
of induction and investigation of the facts can be invoked to deter-
mine whether that relation exists. There may be some instances
of that character where the relationship can be determined without
it. It is not required, for instance, in order to reach the conclu-
sion that contracts not to marry are contrary to public policy as
that is conceived by the society in which that rule prevails. But
such cases will probably be exceptional. This does not mean that
each decision, or proposed new law, must be preceded by elaborate
studies of this kind; there is no reason why the results of past
experience summed up in current judgments of relationships be-
tween facts should not be frequently relied on. They are often
as accurate as those that are the product of what is called science.
There is, however, no denying the desirability of employing the
methods of scientific induction in the fields indicated in this para-
graph, and to check the truth of Whatever assumptions of fact
underlie existing legal machinery and theories, Its applicability
to problems of a different character will be subsequently con-
sidered.
The method just discussed is frequently contrasted with that
of reaching legal conclusions by the methods of deductive reason-
ing to the disadvantage of the latter. It is argued that the wide
disparity between law and the facts of social life is due to an un-
due emphasis on and abuse of deduction in legal reasoning.27 It
is not denied that logical deduction is a legitimate device in those
fields of law where the principal desideratum is certainty, but it is
felt that the method has been applied in fields for which it is
wholly unsuited. The cases generally relied on to support this
view are those involving the validity of social legislation under
the due process and other constitutional provisions, and those
dealing with the application of old principles to situations raising
issues of social policy on which the widest differences of opinion
27Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Col. L Rev. 605.
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exist between the conservative and liberal groups in the communi-
ty. It is a vital element in the sociological jurist's cliticism of our
legal order, which alone would justify its consideration. The
facts afford a real basis for their criticism, but their real objections
are rather to the premises adopted than the mere use of deduction
to arrive at the conclusion. The critics of such decisions as that
denying the validity of minimum wage laws for women object
primarily to the courts' conception of liberty and their judgment
that such regulations are not a reasonable means for promoting a
recognized police power end. Courts and critics would agree on
the barren legal formula that every limitation of individual
freedom by legislation that is not a reasonable exercise of the
police or some other governmental power is a deprivation of lib-
erty without due process of law. The hopeless conflict between
'their conclusions is, therefore, due to some other reason. It may
be due to the adoption of different conceptions of what constitute
reasonable exercises of such powers; it may, on the other hand,
be due to different judgments as to whether the same legislative
act has that character under a definition accepted by both. The
former represents a difference in their major premises; the lat-
ter, in their minor premises. The premises employed in reducing
legal thinking on problems of this character to logical form are
not mere statements of relationships between facts but embody
judgments as to the relative importance of competing ends. The
minimum wage decision might mean either that the court deemed
individual freedom in that phase of economic relations more im-
portant to the groups directly affected and society than the bene-
fits to them that might result from the higher standard of living
rendered possible by the prescribed wages, or that it considered
that such benefits would not flow from minimum wages. It is
only in the latter case that the decision could be said to be wholly
predicated on an assumption of fact, and, therefore, be open to
an attack that the facts had been ignored that could be appraised
without raising the whole problem of how ends should be selected.
If the former alternative states its correct basis and meaning, the
attack will have to be directed at the theory of values adopted by
the court. The validity of its selection cannot be disproved merely
by showing error in its judgment as to the relation between mini-
mum wages and their alleged beneficial results. Its preference
for individual freedom in the matter of wage contracts is per-
fectly consistent with the recognition that other values could be
LEGAL THEORY AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW
secured by its surrender. To criticize its choice on the score that
it has taken either no account, or insufficient account, of those
facts or any others that might be advanced, is intelligible only ii
there be adopted some theory as to the relationship that should
exist between facts and the selection of values against which the
choice in question has offended. A theory of that type is implicit
in every criticism of particular choices made in judicial decisions
or legislation on the score that they ignore the facts or that they
involve the mechanical application of conceptions evolved in dis-
regard of the facts of social life. The failure to make it explicit
deprives such criticisms of a considerable part of their value. It
is a case of confronting one assumption with another with no
recognition by either side of the true character of the dispute be-
tween them. If, then, the essence of the objection to logical deduc-
tion in legal development is to the premises adopted, there is every
reason to so state it. The problem of evaluating the choices ac-
tually made, of examining the validity of the premises actually
adopted, is as inescapable as it appears to be insoluble.
It has already been stated that legal premises embody those
judgments as to the relative worthwhileness of different human
ends that are for some reason or other sought to be realized
through law, and that there is usually a constant struggle for their
revision. They can be explained in terms of past history and pres-
ent competitions; and the factors that have determined whose
views should secure the backing of state force can be discovered. It
is a truism that they have their roots deep down in the facts of hu-
man nature, and are the product of human experience and thinking
about that experience. It is equally patent that they represent but
an imperfect synthesis of the competitions among the members
of the social group, and, therefore, seldom effect that perfect
adjustment of conflicting claims that makes all feel that they are
making equal sacrifices for equal benefits. The owner of a coal
yard who is taxed to support his municipal competitor will quite
likely believe himself the victim of injustice; the person who is
denied a certificate of convenience and necessity to operate a bus
line between points adequately served by existing facilities can
scarcely be expected to approve the theory on which that require-
ment is based. It is this practical certainty that the choice of a
particular value for legal protection or promotion will generally
entail the sacrifice or subordination of others deemed more impor-
tant by some members of the social group that has raised the
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problem of what should determine the selection of values to be
realized through law. It is one to which different thinkers have
given the most diverse answers. It looms largest in legal discus-
sions whenever discontent with what is, produces attempts as
rationalizing current dissatisfaction with prevailing legal stand-
ards. It invariably involves an effort to appraise the existing legal
order by reference to factors outside itself, and is an important
part of the technique by which new values secure recognition in
law. Its consideration leads the speculatively' inclined to that
quest for ultimates that experience shows foredoomed to failure.
The quest is not, however, futile on that accRunt. Its success is
not to be gauged by its failure to solve the insoluble, but by the
value of the critical examinations to which it subjects current
assumptions. Its existence as a vital problem in legal theory can-
not be denied. It is as frequently corlsidered by those who ap-
prove the existing legal order as by those who are attempting to
inject into it new values. The appeal to right and justice is not the
exclusive argument of those who disagree with a particular deci-
sion or statute. The proponents of the eighteenth amendment
invoke it at least as frequently as do its opponents. It is not,
therefore, a matter of raising a novel problem; it is merely that
of consciously recognizing one with which all who are interested
in general problems of law are constantly concerned. The recog-
nition of its importance need not, however, involve any commit-
ment to any of the answers it has received.
This problem must not be confused with that of how a legal
system or any part of its works. The latter involves two distinct
problems. It may refer either to attempts to discover the results
in fact produced by a given legal system or part thereof, or to de-
termine their effectiveness for achieving results assumed as de-
sirable. These are both important, but neither raises the question
of that competition among erds that constitutes the essence of the
instant problem. They can both be treated by the methods of
science since they involve only judgments of fact, while it raises
questions of evaluation that transcend those methods. The latter
proposition has frequently been denied, 28 and the denial is likely to
gain force with the increasing vogue of science, particularly in
dealing with human conduct. The ends actually pursued by a
legal system are those believed in by some of the social group.
28See 0. W. Holmes, Law in Science and Science in Law, 12 Harv.
L. Rev. 443.
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The same is true of those postulated as those it should aim to
realize. The elements of the choice are, therefore, data discover-
able by an investigation into what men want and the order in
which they would prefer to have their wants satisfied. The ques-
tion is whether the facts alone can disclose not only which choices
prevail but which ought to prevail. The result of such decisions
as that in the minimum wage cases is to permit a distribution of
the social product in certain proportions that differ from those
that would have been effected had such laws been enforced. The
purchasing power of the community would be differently dis-
tributed under the two systems of wage determination; some
would have more, others less, influence in giving direction to the
community's economic forces. It is not impossible to predict
the probable difference in results that would follow the selection
of one or the other of these alternative positions as to the validity
of minimum-wage legislation. Those facts however, would give
no clue as to which series of results society ought to choose. If
the choices that should be made are ever to be derived as infer-
ences from facts it will have to be because the facts disclose a
moral order of interests, a necessary order thereof based on the
nature of individual or group conduct, or some dominating inter-
est to which all others are related as means. It would be danger-
ous and futile to deny the possibility or wringing from the facts
some such test in the future; it is safe to say that past efforts to do
so have proved unavailing, and nothing on the intellectual horizon
presages success in that direction within the near future. It may
be that the problem is itself an illusion; it is still true that the
question is being asked as insistently as ever. Man seems bent on
questioning the right of the accepted value judgments to continue
their existence as legal premises, and on giving a rational justifica-
tion for this attitude. As long as this apparently ineradicable
habit persists, legal thinkers will continue their efforts to answer
the problem even though our present inability to adapt the tech-
nique of the sciences to it may expose their answers to the charge
of being -pure speculation.
Doubts as to the validity of existing legal standards are not
always raised on behalf of competing standards, but occasionally
reflect only a belief or theory that their validity can never be
proved. The latter is frequently, but not always, a mere device
for concealing the former. An attack on individualism may in
fact be made on behalf of socialism though couched in terms
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merely questioning the former's ability to prove its right to exist.
Both types aim at the elimination of accepted values, and usually
to substitute others, although the latter aspect is clearer where the
critique is frankly made on that basis. It is difficult, when sur-
veying and observing the interminable controversies about stand-
ards in the past and present, to escape the feeling that all are quite
arbitrary in the sense that we know of no principle for deciding
which should be preferred. This is, however, as true of those
that are struggling for adoption into the legal system as of those
already incorporated in it. It is a viewpoint that makes of ap-
peals to justice reliances upon illusions, which, however, does not
necessarily mean that they are futile. There have been few
thinkers who have frankly adopted a theory of standards in this
field that made them pure creations of man's thinking and other
processes. There have been more who have conceived them as
revealed by God or discoverable by man than have considered them
man-made. A common assumption underlies the thinking of those
who believe it is for science to determine the relative worth of our
different social ends and the somewhat discredited natural law
jurists who considered ultimate standards discoverable through
reason. Both assume that the ends men should strive for are
something more than mere mental constructions, and that there
is an order of values that exists about which we can and do think
but which does not owe its existence to those facts. In so far as
both aim to set up a criterion by which to measure actual legal
systems, they make the further common assumption that such
objectively existing standard is that which law should aim to
realize. The same is true of practically every attempt at evolving
a theory as to the ends of law though there exist the greatest dif-
ferences among them as to the methods by which such standard
is to be discovered. Some seek it through philosophy and meta-
physics; some through science; some through history; and others
by a comparative study of social and legal institutions. These
differences in method cannot, however, obscure the common as-
sumption of them all. There is danger of losing sight of this
whenever a theory of ends is advanced in the name of science or
framed in terms of social welfare. It is not the purpose here to
discuss the correctness of such assumptions, nor the relative merits
of subjectivism and objectivism. The aim is merely to indicate
the common assumptions underlying the various discussions of the
ends of law and of the tests employed in measuring existing
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systems and to give direction for their further development. It
is a purely salutary measure intended to offset the tendency toward
dogmatism that prevails among proponents both of the status quo
and of change.
The detailed consideration of the various ends and orders of
values formulated by legal thinkers, and of those actually adopted
by legal systems, would require a survey of the history of legal
thought and- institutions beyond the scope of this discussion. It
would, moreover, only reveal that same lack of agreement that
prevails in the legal thought and practices of the day. There
appears as yet no principle for determining which is the more
nearly correct. All embody assumptions and represent in large
measure acts of faith; and this is the common quality of both
those incorporated in existing legal systems and those developed
for testing the validity of the former. No controversies are as
likely to prove insoluble as those concerning assumptions. There
are, however, certain problems connected with these efforts to
subject law to an external critique whose discussion is of some
value. All are quite likely to be formulated in terms of some
single inclusive end for law. It is thus that we obtain such gen-
eral formulas as the greatest good to the greatest number of the
English utilitarians, the realm of realized freedom of certain
German metaphysical jurists, and the predominance of the social
interests of our own sociological school. The inevitable vagueness
of such expressions is shared equally by those premises from
which courts and lawyers reason in dealing with the problems of
due process and public policy. It is, therefore, unfair for the
practically minded to object to them on that score, but it is equally
unjustifiable for those who criticize the actual law from these
broad viewpoints to stop with the mere assertion and repetition
of their premises. The minimum wage decisions may have been
wrongly decided, but it adds little to our enlightenment to be told
that they conflict with a particular theory as to what kind of a
social order is desirable. It may be true that the premises from
which our courts reason are those of a past era unsuited to present
needs, but the objection would have greater weight if some effort
at least were made to make explicit the social theory implicit in
it and to present its claims in competition with that implied in
the judicial thinking criticized. The sociological school of juris-
prudence has undoubtedly been a factor in causing a shift in em-
phasis on the values that the legal system has undertaken to pro-
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mote. The time has, however, come for it to make more explicit
the social theory it accepts as a premise. Individualism is itself
a social theory. The sociological jurist can hope to attack it suc-
cessfully only when he recognizes it as such and formulates with
more definiteness than has yet been done the outlines of his com-
peting theory.2 " Its emphasis on the social interests must be made
more intelligible, not by stating what they are or by attempts at
cataloguing, but by analyzing the conceptions themselves. A
whole theory .of the nature of society and of the social process is
implicit in it which is extremely difficult to formulate because of
the complexities involved. And yet the greatest benefits from the
adoption of its point of view are probably tied up with making
that type of analysis. What has been said of the sociological
school is equally applicable to any other general test of the legal
order. The emphasis was put on it because of its wider currency
at present and the general value of its past contributions to creat-
ing an understanding of law as a means to an end.
The vague and broad terms in which theories as to the ends of
law have usually been phrased have created an impression that they
have been developed at the expense of facts. The. feeling is
likely to increase, and justly so, if the methods by which some
have been evolved are considered. This is particularly true of
the extremely metaphysical jurists. The reasons for resorting to
such methods are, as already stated, inherent in the nature of the
problem. We have not yet acquired a technique for deriving what
ought to be solely from what is, and have, therefore, resorted to
the methods of philosophy. It may be that we shall never acquire
it except by assuming that-that which is is that which ought to be.
The part facts should play in constructing our theories of ends
and of the ends of law, and what facts are significant in that con-
nection, are problems seldom considered and still unsolved, but that
will have to be frankly faced by those who believe that science
can determine the relative worth of our social ends. Until that
is done the talk of a science of law in a sense other than the formal
science of the analytical jurists will rest on no securer basis than
the theories of the philosophical jurists, if intended, as is usually
the case, to define a method for testing actual law as distinct from
merely describing in generalized terms what actually happens.
That the ends postulated are in some fashion related to the facts
29For a critique of sociological jurisprudence see Lepaulle, Tie Func-
tion of Comparative Law, 35 Harv. L. Rev. 838.
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of individual and social life is undeniable, and is tacitly recognized
in all theories of such ends. It is an assumption common to them
all. The natural law school's theory of ends had a basis in some
of the facts of human nature; that of the modern sociological
jurists finds similar sanction therein. The real difference between
them is one of emphasis. Men's conceptions of what ought to be
are usually derived from what is, but the final viev is affected by
their thinking about it and that is nof necessarily confined within
those limits. The fact that all such theories assume that the ends
adopted should have some reference to the facts affords a basis
for their comparison. It is necessarily inadequate in the absence
of proof of a common view of the exact relation between them,
but not, therefore, wholly useless. It may, for instance, be pos-
sible to demonstrate to an adherent of the natural law premises
that his scheme is based on an assumption of fact that is no longer
true. Such proof might well induce him to modify his theories,
or even accept a competing one, as required by assumptions he
considers valid. It is apparent that this process of modification
and adjustment of our premises in the caurse of their competi-
tions is possible only because of their common assumption already
referred to. It would be futile to expect to modify by it a view
that law should aim at the most rapid elimination of the human
race adopted in frank opposition to the fact that men desire to
live and continue their species. The constant checking of our
premises by reference to the facts is, therefore, valuable because
it is the only way we have for comparing competing theories as
to the ends law should aim to achieve. In the final analysis, how-
ever, the formulation of our views as to the ends we should strive
for contains an element that has thus far defied the technique
employed in discovering facts, and between which and the facts
we have not yet been able to establish a correlation. It is, there-
fore, premature to expect the competitions between ends to be
decided wholly by the ordinary appeal to the facts. Their con-
flicts cannot be resolved solely by invoking the test of how they
work, since the issue is between rival conceptions of what work
should be accomplished.
The present is a time when the premises from which our law
proceeds are being subjected to a searching critique. It is futile
to blink the fact that not all discontent with law is based on a
breakdown of its machinery. A large part of it is traceable to
differences of opinion as to the kind of social order law should
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
aim to construct. These were clearly reflected in the opposing
views expressed in the arguments on the Mellon tax plan, and
in the prevailing and dissenting opinions in the minimum-wage
case. The dispute is not one that can be intelligently understood
or rationally discussed by frequent and positive assertion of op-
posing views. The dogmatism of vague terms is not the exclusive
privilege of defenders of the status quo; it has a large and faith-
ful following among the advocates of a different social order.
The avenue of escape does not lie in analyzing legal systems for
the purpose of reducing their materials to logical form, but in an
understanding of what is involved when society makes law. It
is only the perception by all concerned that it is a controversy
about premises, whose adoption involves assumptions in every
case, that can eliminate that dogmatism and absolutism which
characterizes so much of our discussion of problems in legal and
social policy. It is desirable that they who play the largest part
in shaping law should consciously grasp the true character of their
activities. It is this that makes the consideration of the general
problems of legal theory, and of the answers that legal thinkers
have given them, of more than speculative interest.
